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MOBILIZING ISLAM IN THE MIDDLE EAST
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The publication of the Mohammed caricatures in Denmark and other European 
countries and the ensuing violent protests in several Muslim countries have 
engendered a debate about the balance between freedom of speech and the need to 
avoid offending religious groups. Such a debate, by nature, is western-centric. It 
focuses on the vision that citizens of Western societies have about what values are 
desirable for their societies. Much less has been written from a perspective that puts 
the Middle East at the center of analysis. In most instances, it has been assumed that 
the (over)reaction in many Middle Eastern countries is simply a result of the offence 
caused by the cartoons, coupled with a misunderstanding of the liberal values that 
permit freedom to offend.
This conventional understanding of a “clash of civilizations” of sorts, I 
suggest, is overly reductionist and misses many of the nuances that characterize 
Middle Eastern societies and politics. Instead, I propose, we can better understand 
the riots by focusing on the behaviour of Middle Eastern regimes and their 
relationship with local societies. I argue that for many authoritarian regimes in the 
Middle East region, the cartoons provided an opportunity to buttress their shaky 
legitimacy by appearing before their domestic public as defenders of Islam, 
protecting it against imperialist aggression. Hence, these regimes had a vested 
interest in inflaming emotions, spreading rumours, and delivering subtle messages to 
the communities under their jurisdiction that, on this occasion, the costs to 
participants involved in the display of public protest would not be as high as they 
normally would be.
In what follows, I first assess the different ways of understanding the events 
surrounding the publication of the cartoons. I explain why a “clash of civilizations” 
approach does not provide useful tools to account for the violent protests that erupted 
in several Middle Eastern countries. I then proceed to provide an alternative 
explanation focusing on regime behaviour. The case of Syria is used for illustration, 
after which I return to general conclusions.
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Understanding the Mohammad Cartoons Affair
Analysis of the political events surrounding the publication of the cartoons can be 
conducted on three dimensions. First, there is the character of the cartoons 
themselves. Second, we can examine the popular claims made against their 
publication. Finally, the third dimension focuses on the overreaction in the streets of 
many Middle Eastern countries. The first two dimensions are intertwined, but it is 
the latter dimension that is essential to gaining a solid understanding of the politics 
that surround the cartoons affair.
Lest it be misunderstood, the insensitive nature of the cartoons should not 
be understated. Cartoons that portray the Muslim prophet wearing a turban shaped 
like a bomb are not only offensive, they also border on bigotry. Their underlying 
message is that the Muslim belief system as a whole is conducive to violence and 
suicide bombing, hence all followers of the Islamic faith are prone to violent 
behaviour in the name of their religion. In this respect, these types of messages 
resemble images of Jews as all-powerful and world-dominating (or at the very least, 
as capable of dictating American foreign policy).
Myths about, and essentialist assessment of, the so-called Muslim culture 
are not new. In academia too, for a very long time, scholarly work assumed the 
existence of some kind of cultural perversity in the Muslim Middle East. Violence, 
authoritarianism, and instability have too often been interpreted as reflections of 
cultural defects, the origins of which are to be found in religion. As a result, Middle 
Easterners have been portrayed as fundamentally unlike Westerners. That Europe of 
the twentieth century saw much more political violence, two world wars, genocides, 
and other large scale atrocities, escapes the attention of those who point to inherent 
attributes or a peculiar Islamic “mind-set”, non-favourable to democratic, peaceful 
politics.1
Ironically, culture-centric explanations seemingly get reinforced by the 
violent behaviour of the protestors coupled by claims made by many Islamists 
against the cartoons. After all, we do not see Jews burning British embassies around 
the world in response to cartoons published in British newspapers that depict the Star 
of David on a map of the United States (a reflection of the old myth about Jewish 
domination of the world). Nor did we see violent protests by world Jewry in 
response to the broadcasting of explicit anti-Semitic programming on Arab 
television.
Furthermore, many Islamists appeared in a variety of media outlets, 
explaining that the problem was not only with a particularly offensive cartoon, but 
that rather any representation of the Prophet, forbidden in Islam, should be avoided. 
Thus, the message conveyed is that the riots broke out in reaction to blasphemous
1 One example, among several, o f  such scholarship is Elie Kedourie, Democracy and Arab Political 
Culture (Washington, DC: Institute for Near East Policy, 1992).
behaviour. Aside from the dubious accuracy of these claims -  Mohammad has been 
portrayed in the past (including in traditional Muslim art) without such repercussions
-  such demands essentially translate into requiring non-Muslims to conform to 
Muslim codes of conduct. This, in turn, reinforces fears that we are indeed in an era 
in which the spread of Islamic influence will threaten the liberal, Western way of 
life.
Both of these dimensions - the publication of the cartoons, on the one hand, 
and the substance of much of the criticism levelled against them - can be interpreted 
as providing proof of the incompatibility of Islam and western-liberal values. And 
yet, treating Islam as a singular, static concept misses the differentiation that exists in 
every society, every culture, and every religion. It was Samuel Huntington, the 
prestigious political scientist from Harvard accredited with formulating the clash of 
civilizations thesis, who maintained that Islam, like any religion, is complex, 
containing some elements favourable to democracy and others that are less so. The 
political salience of these features changes over time. But, more importantly, 
according to Huntington, contrary to conventional wisdom, Islam does not have a 
significant influence over attitudes towards politics.2
More recent survey research, conducted by Mark Tessler, confirms 
Huntington’s argument. Tessler examined the actual causal connection between 
attitudes towards liberal democratic norms and practices relating to Islam in several 
Muslim countries, including Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, and the Palestinian 
Territories. In the survey, the interviewees were asked about the importance of 
democratic governance, such as openness to diverse political ideas and opinions, 
holding regular free and fair elections, maintaining government accountability, and 
so on and so forth. In addition, the interviewees were asked about the degree to 
which they perform religious practices, such as prayer, observance, and other rituals. 
Finally, the survey targeted the interviewees’ opinions on the desirability of political 
involvement of religious leaders and movements in public affairs as well as on the 
role Islam should play in political life. The project could not identify any 
relationship, positive or inverse, between religious devoutness and attitudes towards 
democracy. Thus, the results of the survey confirm that Islam has far less influence 
on political attitudes than is sometimes thought.3
Explaining the Violent Outrage -  Authoritarianism and Legitimacy
Indeed, it appears that the dimensions that focus exclusively on the offensive 
character of the cartoons and the claims made against their publications, both of 
which characterize a culture-centric approach, are insufficient to account for the 
violent outrage that spread throughout the Middle East. An alternative explanation 
focuses on the interests of regimes in the Middle East. Of course, it could be argued
2 Samuel P. Huntington, “Democracy’s Third Wave” (1991) 2:2 Journal o f Democracy 12 at 28.
3 Mark Tessler, “Islam and Democracy in the Middle East: The Impact o f Religious Orientations on 
Attitudes Toward Democracy in Four Arab Countries” (2002) 34 Comparative Politics 337.
that these regimes reflect local values and attitudes. However, it should be 
remembered that the Middle Eastern regimes in question are among the most 
repressive and coercive in the world. It is precisely because they are not 
representative of their societies that Middle Eastern regimes are authoritarian. Their 
lack of legitimacy forces them to resort to coercion. Otherwise, they would have to 
face challenges from alternative rule-makers who are more representative of local 
preferences.
Many regimes in the Middle Eastern region have found it useful to appeal to 
Islamist sentiments in order to bolster their legitimacy in the eyes of their population. 
This is not a new phenomenon. In the 1970s, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt made 
public show of his piety. Sadat lacked the charisma and heroic background of his 
predecessor, Gamal abd-al Nasser. Whereas Nasser could rely on his image and 
history as the leader of Arab nationalism in the struggle against European and 
American imperialism, Sadat had to look for other sources of legitimacy. Facing 
criticism from left-wing student organizations for what they perceived as the 
regime’s divergence from the socialist ideals of the 1952 Officers’ Coup, Sadat 
sought to weaken his critics by allowing Islamists to operate alternative associations 
as a counter force. This was a divide-and-rule strategy of sorts. Trying to build an 
alliance with religious elements in society, Sadat promoted programming with 
Islamic content in the media and the education system. He expanded government 
support of official religious institutions, and he used Islamic themes to justify his 
policies. That he was eventually accused by Islamists of not going far enough with 
his commitment is evidence of the unintended consequences of his policy. He was 
unable to contain the forces he had initially unleashed to strengthen his claim for 
political authority.
In Iraq too, the secular regime of Saddam Hussein frequently manipulated 
religious themes. Most notable is the reference to an historic Arab-Muslim battle 
against the Persians, used to mobilize the population for the Iraq-Iran War in the 
1980s. Controlling the public discourse, the regime labelled this war as Qadisiyyat - 
Sadam. The original battle at al-Qadisiyya, which took place in the year 637 AD, 
saw the Arabs bring about the collapse of the Persians' dynasty, enabling the spread 
of Islam eastwards. Hence, the battle was endowed with religious significance. 
Given that the majority of Iraqis, like the Iranians, are Shi’ite and Saddam was from 
the minority Sunni sect, and given that the regime’s official ideology was socialist- 
secular, there was a real threat that support for the war amongst the Shi’ite 
population in Iraq would be minimal. Therefore, the regime resorted to appealing to 
collective historical memory, which carries emotional baggage of religious 
significance, in order to mobilize the population and enhance the legitimacy of the 
war.
The Case of Syria
As in Iraq, the Syrian state is controlled by a small, sectarian minority. However, the 
Alawi rule has been facing even greater obstacles to its legitimacy because many 
Islamists, particularly Sunnis, question the authenticity of Alawi Islamism. Indeed, a
long history of animosity, and sometimes isolation and persecution, has created two 
distinct identity groups in Syria. Members of the Alawi minority, constituting 
approximately 11 percent of the population, have been controlling the regime since 
the late 1960s. In turn, many in the Sunni community, composing approximately 75 
percent of the population, feel alienated.
Since its emergence, the Alawi-dominated regime has perceived Sunni 
Islamists as the greatest threat to its stability. To consolidate its authority, the regime 
has been relying on a hybrid strategy of brutal, penetrative coercion and other 
mechanisms to increase its legitimacy. In particular, the ruling echelon has taken 
steps to blur sectarian differentiation by fostering an Islamic-friendly image.
The initial cleavage between the two sects can be traced back to the ninth 
century when the Alawis split away from the Shi’ite tradition of Islam. Many devout 
Sunnis and Shi’ites do not recognize Alawi doctrine and practices as Islamic and 
consider the sect heretical. From the outset, tension characterized relations between 
Sunnis and Alawis. Due to persecution, Alawis retreated to rural and mountainous 
areas near the western coast of Syria, where, for centuries, they were able to live out 
of mainstream reach. Alawi subordination and isolation intensified under the rule of 
the Ottoman Empire when local Sunni elites were incorporated into the 
administrative apparatus. Furthermore, the official religion of the Empire was Sunni 
Islam, and although the Ottoman system gave some autonomy to non-Muslim 
communities to handle their own cultural and religious affairs, the Alawis were not 
granted official status. Thus they were governed directly by the Sunni judicial and 
executive system, but were treated as inferior and subjected to special taxes, physical 
harassment, and social discrimination. The extent of retreat and isolation was such 
that by 1920, the year in which the French received a mandate from the League of 
Nations to rule Syria, only 700 of about 175,000 Alawis lived in towns.4 Indeed, 
Richard Antoun suggests that the term “Alawi” carries the meaning of “a territory, a 
politico-economic system, a wide ranging cultural repertoire, and a history.”
Power relations changed when the French took over. Typical divide-and- 
rule tactics and minority-favouring policies translated into significant social and 
political gains for the Alawis. For a short while, the French even granted the Alawis 
an autonomous state in the region where they were concentrated. Furthermore, 
whereas national sentiments were rising amongst the Sunni Syrians, Alawis, 
recruited by the French into the security apparatus, were mostly responsible for 
suppressing Sunni-led uprisings. Hence, on the one hand, Sunni resentment toward 
Alawis increased during the colonial period as the latter were perceived as
4 Oded Haklai, “A Minority Rule over a Hostile Majority: The Case o f Syria” (2000) 6:3 Nationalism and 
Ethnic Politics 19 at 31.
5 Richard T. Antoun, “Ethnicity, Clientship, and Class: Their Changing Meaning” in Richard T. Antoun & 
Donald Quataert, eds., Syria: Society, Culture and Polity (Albany: State University o f New York Press, 
1991) at 10.
collaborators. On the other hand, French policies also helped transition Alawi 
society away from its traditional peasant and rural social characteristics.
Ultimately, the legacies of French colonialism included mutual Alawi-Sunni 
resentment coupled with an Alawi-dominated military. Political instability 
throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, a series of coups, and an alliance between the 
Ba’th Party and the military eventually led to a 1966 coup from which point Alawis 
began to dominate Syrian politics. The Ba’th party, formed in 1953 by Akram 
Hourani, a socialist Sunni, and Michel Aflaq, a Christian intellectual educated in 
France, espoused an ideology that embraced pan-Arab nationalism, socialism, and 
secularism. As such, it was attractive to the Alawi minority. It was one of the very 
few channels for Alawis to express their political preferences. To a large extent, 
there was an overlap between the military and the party, as a close alliance was 
formed and key personnel in the military also had influence in the party.
With such a history, it is easy to understand why the regime would seek 
ways to increase the bases of its legitimacy. Indeed, it is against this background that 
the behaviour of the contemporary Syrian regime needs to be analyzed. Stability 
was largely attained through the informal military-Ba’th pact. The regime employed 
the most coercive measures to defeat potential challengers to its authority. In 
addition, an expansive and controlling bureaucracy has been established to penetrate 
society and minimize any public space autonomous of the Syrian state. Nonetheless, 
even the most coercive of authoritarian regimes needs to establish a support base that 
will provide some legitimacy to its rule, all the more so in the context of inter­
sectarian hostilities with a long history of conflict. One of the means the regime has 
been employing to strengthen its legitimacy is blurring the internal religious 
differentiation. The Alawi regime has been portraying itself as friendly toward Islam.
This has not always been the case. Initially, committed to its secular 
ideological underpinnings, the Ba’th regime attempted to introduce a constitution 
that separates religion and state. Sunnis, in turn, received this move with great 
anxiety and countered with street protests, leading the regime to change its plan and 
amend its constitution. Nonetheless, conditions were conducive to the rise of the 
radical Islamist movement, the Muslim Brotherhood. As the Islamists were gaining 
in popularity, the regime realized that it could no longer rely exclusively on coercion 
and so had to demonstrate its commitment to religion. In particular, the regime was 
shaken by the attempted assassination of President Hafez al-Asad in 1980 and the 
brutal suppression of the Islamist rebellion in Hamah, resulting in the massacre of 
tens of thousands of Brotherhood supporters. Following the Hamah revolt, the ruling 
apparatus began to publicly demonstrate its religious devoutness. The regime 
invested in new mosques, and public television began to regularly cover the 
President’s participation in prayer service.
Extensive coercion, coupled with strategies of legitimacy, facilitated regime 
sustainability for a very long time. However, following the death of Asad after thirty 
years of rule, and the coronation of his son, Bashar, questions regarding the stability 
of the regime began to be raised. Fears that external powers could dictate changes to
the Syrian regime grew after the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. The 
loss of Lebanon further ignited scepticism regarding Bashar’s ability to control his 
subordinates and simultaneously protect Syria’s interest. With its open economy and 
entrepreneurial opportunities, Lebanon was an enormous financial asset to the 
Syrians. The impact of its loss cannot be overstated.
With these developments in the background, the cartoons provided an 
indispensable opportunity for the regime to bolster its status by demonstrating to the 
domestic population both its commitment to Islam and its ability to stand up to 
western powers. The regime did so, together with other Middle Eastern 
governments, by facilitating the spread of inaccurate rumours with regards to the 
content of the cartoons. At the same time, the regime communicated to the populace 
that protesting the cartoons would not be punished in the same way that street 
protests normally are in Syria.
When discussing a top-down interpretation of violent street protests, it 
should be kept in mind that most of the protestors do not have access to online or 
European newspapers, and had never actually seen the cartoons in question. Indeed, 
it was a group of Danish imams who travelled to the Middle East to present 
representatives of local regimes with a folder, containing the published cartoons. 
The folder, however, also contained other, more offensive images of Mohammed 
with a pig snout, Mohammed as a pedophile, and a Muslim being subjected to anal 
sex by a dog while engaged in prayer.
Whether Middle Eastern governments were aware that these depictions 
were unpublished is not important. The more significant point is that they were the 
only major actors in the Middle East with any information to begin with. And as 
such, they presented the affair to their publics as a Western attack on Islam, 
reinforcing fears that Islam is being threatened by the powerful western aggressors. 
In an elaborate study of ethnicity-related violence, Donald Horowitz has observed 
that
[r]umors form an essential part of the riot process. They justify the 
violence that is about to occur. Their severity is often an indicator 
of the severity of the impending violence. Rumors narrow the 
options that seem available to those who join crowds and commit 
them to a line of action. They mobilize ordinary people to do what 
they would not ordinarily do. ... They project onto the future 
victims of violence the very impulses entertained by those who 
will victimize them. They confirm the strength and danger 
presented by the target group, thus facilitating violence bom of 
fear. Rumors, then, are not stray tales.6
6 Donald L. Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot (Berkeley: University o f  California Press, 2001) at 74-75.
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The recalling of ambassadors and calls to punish the Danes and their 
European supporters, boycott Danish products, and take other punitive measures, not 
only against the publishing newspaper, but against the West as a whole, came from 
the top down. They fed into fears of Western aggression and served the political 
needs of the Syrian regime, as well as many other regimes in the Middle Eastern 
region. In doing so, however, they also legitimized violent riots. Those who were 
engaged in the violence were of the conviction that they were acting in defence of 
Islam. That is the message they got from the ruling echelon. The domino effect then 
also caused the riots to spread to other countries in which no such similar interest 
existed.
Conclusion
The goals of the analysis presented here are two-fold. First, the focus is shifted away 
from a Western-centric debate to a perspective that focuses on Middle Eastern 
politics. Second, the discussion counters a prevailing trend, adopted by many 
commentators, viewing the Mohammed cartoons furor as a clash of civilizations of 
sorts. Interpreting the cartoon affair as a battle featuring the freedom of speech 
versus Muslim sensitivities is evidently insufficient for explaining the violent riots 
that spread throughout many Muslim countries. Rather, I suggest that the domestic 
politics in many Middle Eastern countries are such that the cartoons presented 
regimes, Syria serving as a prime example, with opportunities to strengthen their 
legitimacy. Domestic leaders could demonstrate commitment to Islam and 
concomitant capacity to counter perceived Western aggression. The riots, therefore, 
occurred because they served the interests of some regimes.
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